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Structural Modeling and Policy Simulation
A primary goal of research in marketing is to evaluate
and recommend optimal policies for marketing actions, or
“instruments” in the terminology of Franses (2005). In this
respect, marketing is a very policy-oriented field, and it is
ironic that so much published research skirts the issue of
policy evaluation. Franses’s article draws much needed
attention to the question of what sort of model is usable for
policy simulation and evaluation. Our perspective on what
constitutes a valid model for policy evaluation differs from
Franses’s view, but we believe our view complements his in
many important respects. We also strongly believe that mar-
keting has much to contribute to the literature on structural
modeling. We outline some of what we believe are the
advantages for marketing scholars of using structural mod-
eling for policy evaluations and some of the challenges pre-
sented by marketing problems.
Franses focuses on a reduced-form sales response model
in which the outcome variable (yt) is modeled conditional
on marketing variables (xt). If customers anticipate future
marketing actions and take these into account in responding
to the environment at time t, an additional equation is
appended to the system to describe the evolution of the xt
variables. In Franses’s view, this system can be used for
policy simulation if both the y and x equations have time-
invariant parameters. That is, the Lucas critique, which
implies that parameters of reduced-form models change if
the policy regime changes, does not apply. According to
Franses, a model must pass standard diagnostics, possess
good predictive properties, and exhibit parameter stability
to be useful for policy simulation. We applaud the attention
Franses is bringing to model diagnostics. We believe that
structural work in both marketing and economics should
pay close attention to the central features of the data.
Increased use of model diagnostics will help ensure that
structural models are capable of capturing these features.
However, we do not believe that all the criteria proposed by
Franses, such as out-of-sample validity and parameter sta-
bility, are either necessary or sufficient to render a model
useful for policy simulation.
Reduced-form models can pass all diagnostics, including
out-of-sample validation, and still provide misleading pre-
dictions about the effects of policy changes. Reduced-form
1Subsequently, we formally define a structural model and argue why it is
preferable to a reduced-form model for policy evaluations.
models can exploit the well-known bias/variance trade-off
explicitly to achieve excellent predictive performance.
Because most investigators use predictive validation to cali-
brate or choose their model specifications, it is likely that
reduced-form models have superior predictive performance
relative to a structural model that is built using other crite-
ria. Unless the policy regime changes, even out-of-sample
validation cannot determine whether a model produces reli-
able forecasts of policy changes. For example, suppose we
fit a model of sales regressed on regular price and a deal
variable using data from a “high–low”-style market. This
model could pass all standard diagnostics and provide
excellent predictive validation. However, if we try to apply
this model to everyday low price markets in which the same
products are sold, we may dramatically underestimate the
effects of regular price changes because consumers’
response to long-term and short-term price changes depends
on their expectations of the depth and frequency of deals. In
summary, it is entirely possible for a structural model to
have poor predictive performance relative to a reduced-form
model and still be useful for policy evaluation.1
These points apply with equal force to tests for parameter
variation. A model may appear to have time-invariant
parameters simply because the policy regime has remained
constant. Conversely, a model may exhibit parameter varia-
tion for reasons other than changes in policy. Smooth evolu-
tion of model parameters can create much needed flexibility
in the model. This flexibility can be imparted to either a
reduced-form or a structural model.
The bottom line is that standard predictive validation
exercises are not sufficient to discriminate between models
in terms of their usefulness for policy simulation. These
standard predictive validation tests mostly determine the
optimal point on the bias/variance trade-off frontier. How-
ever, we do not want to take this point too far. If a model
has particularly bad in-sample or out-of-sample fit, it may
be because the model does not capture some salient feature
of the data. In this sense, we believe that prediction can be a
useful tool to help sort among candidate structural models,
even though predictive performance cannot answer the
question of usefulness for policy simulation. However, what
is required is a more demanding prediction exercise in
which the marketing policy environment shifts. In some
cases, variation in the policy regime may not be present in
the data (particularly with highly aggregate data). In these
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properly specified the primitives of the model and that these
primitives are policy invariant.
DEFINITION OF STRUCTURAL MODELS
A structural model begins with a view that observed
behavior is the outcome of a decision process in which a
consumer or firm makes optimal decisions based on a max-
imization of an objective function subject to resource con-
straints. This view is broad and not very limiting in terms of
behavior. Much “irrational” behavior is only irrational rela-
tive to a specific objective function and constraint set. If
sufficient latitude is allowed in the setup of the optimization
problem, many behaviors are possible.
Demand-Side Modeling
Marketing begins with an understanding of the consumer.
Therefore, most structural models begin with a specification
of the consumer’s objective function and constraints. It also
requires that the modeler determine the decision variables
for the consumer, the information set available to the con-
sumer, the resource constraint, and the time horizon. For
example, a “simple” demand model would specify a utility
function over a set of consumption goods x and prices p and
a budget constraint given income y. This problem could be
written as follows:
(1) maxx u(x|θ), subject to p′x ≤ y.
The solution to this problem is a decision rule, x = f(p, y),
which specifies how this particular consumer responds to
price and income or expenditure allocation changes. The
hope and assumption here is that the utility parameters (θ)
do not change when prices change.
This model is a simple abstraction, which does not ade-
quately describe the world. However, before this model is
discounted completely, we should remember that much of
the industrial organization and marketing literature is built
on models that are not much more complicated than our
model. We subsequently delineate ways that this model
might be elaborated on to capture various important fea-
tures of the marketing environment.
First, although price may be one of the most important
instruments of marketing policy, it is not the sole one. Pro-
motional and advertising variables can be entered into this
model. A simple way to do so would be to make the utility
parameters a function of these variables. However, advertis-
ing and promotional variables can also have more indirect
effects through the information set of the consumer. In this
simple example, the consumer is assumed to be fully aware
of the marketing environment, which consists of the vector
of prices. An important area of research is the structural
modeling of the information set available to the consumer.
If the consumer is not fully price aware, we might model
the process by which the consumer “samples” or acquires
price information (see Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003,
2004). The structural approach requires that we model the
acquisition of price information as an optimal search
process in which the consumer trades off the cost of addi-
tional price information with the benefits (as measured by
higher levels of attainable expected utility). This approach
also gives us a way to understand how certain types of
advertising can be evaluated. In-store displays, for example,
can be thought of as devices to provide lower-cost price
information to the consumer.
Second, the simple demand model is a static or one-
period model. Multiperiod data can be thought of as a
sequence of one-period problems or the result of a more
complicated dynamic model. A simple motivation for con-
sidering nontrivial multiperiod models is to recognize that
we must separate the purchase and consumption decisions.
In marketing data sets, we typically only observe purchase
decisions. If we want to model purchase behavior, we must
consider that consumers are purchasing products in antici-
pation of future consumption (see Dubé 2004; Erdem, Imai,
and Keane 2003; Hendel 1999). Therefore, we must include
an inventory accumulation and intertemporal budget con-
straint into a demand model. In this multiperiod model, con-
sumers attempt to maximize the total or discounted flow of
utility that is subject to inventory accumulation and budget
constraints. This formulation requires some assumptions
about the horizon of the decision process, as well as a spec-
ification of utility over multiple periods of consumption. For
mostly reasons of convenience, these models are specified
with a simple additive utility function and an infinite plan-
ning horizon. Finite planning horizons and nonseparable
utility functions dramatically complicate the class of opti-
mal decision rules.
Third, in a multiperiod model, it is important to specify
the information set available to the consumer. At one
extreme, we could assume that the consumer is myopic or
totally ignorant of the future course of prices. At the other,
we might assume that the consumer is omniscient and
knows the entire future path of prices. Reality lies some-
where in between. The consumer has expectations of the
future values of prices but can never be certain and therefore
regards the path of prices as the outcome of a stochastic
process. From a policy point of view, uncertainty about the
future values of prices means that expectations of prices (as
well as, possibly, other aspects of the price stochastic
process) enter into the optimal decision rules. Demand at
time t will depend not just on current prices but also on cur-
rent inventory levels and expectations of future prices. The
decision rule or demand function will be a function of the
parameters of the stochastic process that governs prices. A
policy change in this world involves a change in the param-
eters of the price process. The importance of the structural
approach is that it provides reliable predictions of changes
in demand as price process parameters change.
A reduced-form approach to dynamic demand models
would be to specify a multivariate time-series model (such
as a vector autoregression) for both the purchase time series
and the time series of marketing instruments (e.g., price).
This joint modeling does not ensure that predictions are
immune from the Lucas critique. If we change the parame-
ters of the price process, the parameters of the purchase
process will change as well. Standard time-series models do
not forge this explicit link between the two processes.
Fourth, price uncertainty is not the only type of uncer-
tainty that may figure into multiperiod or dynamic settings.
The consumer may also be learning about attributes of a
product, such as its overall level of quality. Consumer learn-
ing also provides an explicit role for advertising as a means
to provide information or quality signals. In a dynamic set-
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through some sort of Bayesian paradigm. For example, in
Erdem and Keane’s (1996) study, consumers learn about the
quality of detergents through consumption and advertising.
This learning aspect of consumer behavior gives rise to an
experimentation motive by which the consumer may decide
to sample a product whose expected utility at the current
time is less than other available products (the multi-arm
bandit problem). The problem with the standard Bayesian
model of learning is that the posterior eventually degener-
ates on the true value of the parameter for which learning is
required, which introduces a curious nonstationarity in
which consumers are born ignorant but shortly become per-
fectly informed.
Fifth, another issue that is noteworthy with respect to
demand-side modeling is the nature of the data available to
the researcher, namely, individual versus aggregate.
Although recent advances in data collection technology
have increased the availability of high-quality individual-
(or household-) level data, researchers still are more likely
to have access to aggregate-level data (at the store, chain, or
market level). The availability of data at the aggregate level
may partly explain why researchers often use reduced-form
models for demand specification. However, one of the more
important recent developments in the modeling of demand
has been the development of aggregate-level demand mod-
els that start from the microeconomic foundations of utility
maximization at the individual level and then explicitly
aggregate over a heterogeneous population of subjects to
derive the aggregate demand function that preserves the
economic primitives of consumer preferences. The resulting
demand model is structural (Berry 1994; Berry, Levinsohn,
and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2001).
This development of structural demand models that can
be estimated from aggregate data has spawned many studies
that examine various policy implications. For example,
Chintagunta, Dubé, and Singh (2003) examine the firm
profit and consumer welfare implications of a retailer
adopting a zone pricing policy relative to uniform pricing.
Likewise, Nevo (2001) examines the implications of merg-
ers in the ready-to-eat cereal markets.
Useful as these models are as structural representations
of demand, we caution that the blind application of them is
also not appropriate. For example, the aggregate random-
effects logit model has many desirable properties (e.g., is
parsimonious, easy to estimate) and produces plausible
results. However, in certain situations, a discrete choice
logit model may not capture the true behavior of customers
on any purchase occasion. In product categories in which
consumers buy more than one brand/type/size/flavor and
buy more than one unit on any purchase occasion, a discrete
choice model may not capture the true underlying economic
primitives of the consumer. Policy simulations based on
such a model could lead to incorrect inferences.
Supply-Side Modeling
Given the many possible choices of information sets, util-
ity functions, and constraints, models of consumer behavior
alone can easily become extremely complicated. These
models also present challenges for estimation. However, a
demand model alone may be incomplete without additional
modeling assumptions of firm behavior and market equilib-
rium. A complete model would specify a firm’s objective
function, as well as a model for the interaction between
firms in markets with a small number of competing firms.
There are several strong arguments for this point of view.
First, the goal of marketing is to advise firms about the
optimal setting of their marketing instruments. This advice
requires a model not only of how consumers respond to
changes in the firm’s policy but also of how the firm’s com-
petitors will respond to its actions. Second, if the model of
firm behavior and marketing equilibrium is correct, it can
yield valuable information that, when imposed on the data,
can produce more efficient estimates of the demand-side
parameters. Finally, the strategic behavior of the firm may
make it dangerous to condition simply on the values of mar-
keting variables in estimating demand (see Berry, Levin-
sohn, and Pakes 1995; Besanko, Gupta, and Jain 1998;
Bronnenberg and Mahajan 2001; Manchanda, Rossi, and
Chintagunta 2004; Villas-Boas and Winer 1999; Villas-Boas
and Zhao 2005). This challenge is known as the endogene-
ity problem. For example, as Villas-Boas and Winer (1999)
emphasize, if there is a common demand shock and the firm
sets the price with even partial knowledge of this demand
shock, it may create a correlation between price and the
demand error term.
Balanced against the advantages of modeling the supply
side are several important considerations. Specification
error in the supply side can result in substantial biases in the
demand-side estimates. It is common to use a single-period
Bertrand-Nash model of firm behavior. Because firms
remain in business for more than one period and multi-
period models can give rise to a bewildering variety of pos-
sible equilibria, the assumption of a static Nash equilibrium
might be misleading. Finally, a full model of demand and
supply leaves little or no room for improvement in the exist-
ing set of marketing policies. That is, we assume that firms
are behaving optimally and impose this assumption on our
model. This status leaves the marketer with no prescriptive
advice to give. In a sense, this discussion is an oversimplifi-
cation, as we discuss in our concluding section.
Because of the problems with the specification of the
supply side, there is growing sentiment to eliminate this
part of the model and deal with possible endogeneity prob-
lems through instrumental variables. This solution, how-
ever, may simply be replacing one possible source of speci-
fication error with another. There are no general methods of
ascertaining whether an instrumental variable is valid. Short
of randomized experiments, there are no true instruments;
there are only instruments that are more valid than others.
Moreover, it may not be possible to determine logically
whether a variable is a valid instrument without a model of
(or at least perspective on) supply-side behavior. Another
important problem is that many instruments have very lim-
ited variation, so it may be impossible to obtain reliable
demand estimates with these weak instruments.
The supply side has received scant attention in the grow-
ing marketing literature on dynamic consumer models.
Even the monopoly case has not been solved. For example,
in a dynamic pricing model, it would be worthwhile to
derive the optimal stochastic process for prices and explain
the role of firm competition in determining these policies.
On the advertising side, recent structural work by Dubé,
Hitsch, and Manchanda (2004) addresses the problem of
optimal dynamic policies with a realistic demand model.
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discrimination, a problem long neglected in the empirical
demand literature.
In this section, we have provided our definition of what
constitutes a structural model. We should note that all
structural modelers must make compromises regarding
what phenomena are modeled using rigorous structural
concepts. All empirical applications of structural models
use reduced-form components, in that not all of the actual
empirical specifications can be derived from optimizing
behavior or in that some component of behavior is not
modeled. We strongly caution our colleagues to refrain
from the tendency to require that a model be comprehen-
sive. In our view, it is much better to do a good job on a
small part of the picture than to create an impossibly com-
plicated or ad hoc model. Finally, we have emphasized that
a “structural” model can focus primarily on the demand or
supply side without including both. Endogeneity concerns
are not the exclusive domain of structural models either.
Not all structural approaches need to deal with endogene-
ity, and not all approaches to endogeneity need to be fully
structural.
STRUCTURAL MODELING IN MARKETING:
ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES
All too frequently, researchers in marketing are viewed as
net consumers of work from other fields. In the structural
modeling area, we believe that there is a real opportunity
for marketing researchers to make unique and innovative
contributions. This opportunity stems from our uniquely
rich data, as well as our challenging set of problems.
Data in marketing are dramatically richer than those in
economics in a variety of important ways. We have access
to much more disaggregate data. (We use the term “disag-
gregate” broadly.) It is well known that we have rich panel
data, but it is less well known or exploited that we have data
on various different markets and/or firms at the same point
in time. Modeling spatial aspects of these data is important,
and understanding how changes in market structure and the
consumer base affect firm behavior is an opportunity for
marketers. We also can observe data on a huge variety of
different products, which presents new challenges and
opportunities for structural modeling. Solving the “loca-
tion” or product positioning problem, as well as that of pric-
ing and marketing existing products, is an exciting area. We
also observe sales data at a relatively high frequency, which
provides opportunities to study dynamics.
It is worthwhile to contrast the data-rich environment of
marketing researchers with that of many researchers in the
industrial organization area. A fair criticism of some work
in that area is that elaborate structural models are used to
overcome an inherent data limitation, such as the lack of
quantity information, insufficient or nonexistent price varia-
tion, or the lack of disaggregate data. This comment is not
intended to fault these researchers, but in marketing, we do
not experience many of these data limitations.
Structural modeling has focused almost exclusively on
behavioral or marketplace data, which are obtained by pas-
sive observation. There is another tradition in marketing
that uses survey or experimental methods to make direct
measurements of consumer utility. Because behavioral data
are often not sufficient to identify the parameters of many
complex structural models adequately, direct measurement
methods might be used in conjunction with behavior data to
tackle particularly tough problems.
Researchers in marketing often have access to wholesale
price or cost data, which provide an additional source of
information. More generally, researchers in marketing have
greater access to information about firm behavior, which
can be used to construct more realistic models of firm
behavior.
Accompanying these rich data are a set of challenges that
confront the structural modeler. Disaggregate data are fun-
damentally discrete, which means that standard continuous
demand models are not adequate. Demand models that
exhibit a mixture of interior and corner solutions are often
required (Kim, Allenby, and Rossi 2002).
Marketers often do not have direct control over the mar-
keting environment that their customers face. Thus, models
of the distribution channel are often important. In turn, this
opens new opportunities for testing models of market struc-
ture given the availability of data from the distribution
channel. Historically, such data were often lacking (e.g.,
Sudhir 2001; Villas-Boas 2004).
Marketing decisions are made on different time scales.
Pricing decisions may be made each week, whereas adver-
tising and promotional decisions are made over a longer
horizon (from six weeks to a quarter). Building a structural
model that includes constraints on decisions or a rationale
for these time frames is an exciting challenge.
The basic conundrum of positive economics—we assume
that firms behave optimally so we have nothing to add in a
normative sense—can be solved by careful attention to the
information set available to firms. In economics, it is typical
to assume that the firm knows the demand schedule per-
fectly. More work is required to consider the situation in
which the firm behaves optimally relative to some informa-
tion set and more information becomes available. For exam-
ple, consider the situation in which the firm knows aggre-
gate demand but has little information about individual
consumers. If this information becomes available, it may
present a profit opportunity for a firm that knows how to
exploit it.
Managers follow various heuristics that deviate from
optimal policies. One response is to modify the principles
of optimal behavior (i.e., what has become known as
behavioral economics). Another is to introduce various
decision costs and/or uncertainties into the model to make a
heuristic optimal. Little if any empirical work has
addressed the latter approach (cf. Montgomery and Brad-
low 1999).
CONCLUSION
We  hope that Franses’s (2005), Van Heerde, Dekimpe,
and Putsis’s (2005), and our articles will bring increased
attention to structural modeling and policy simulation.
Structural modeling is a difficult endeavor with many trade-
offs among realistic assumptions, econometric feasibility,
and complexity. There is no one right approach, and we
hope that researchers, reviewers, and editors will keep an
open mind rather than establish a checklist approach to
evaluating structural research. It is important to remember
that the purpose of specifying and estimating a structural
model is to make policy recommendations. Virtuosity in
modeling is to be admired but only as the means to achieve
the end of improvements in marketing actions. As the mar-26 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, FEBRUARY 2005
keting field matures, we should anticipate more focus on
policy experiments in the literature. Finally, we have
emphasized that marketing has much to offer structural
modeling, and we expect that some of the best work on
structural modeling will come from the marketing side of
the aisle.
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